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Abstract
During the anti-Japanese war, “allying with Soviet” was 
the most important international relation and “cooperating 
wi th  Chinese  Communis t  Par ty”  was  the  most 
important domestic political relation to Chinese national 
government and Kuomintang. Taking into account the 
special relationship between Soviet Union and Chinese 
Communist Party, the two were interrelated, inter-
influenced and promoted each other. Sino-Soviet Cultural 
Association not only played a positive role in Sino-Soviet 
diplomacy, but also had a significant impact in promoting 
the legal status of CPC, Wannan Incident, Chongqing 
Negotiation and other sensitive issues concerning the 
establishment of second KMT-CPC cooperation in the 
critical period.
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INTRODUCTION
After the “September 18” incident, the failure of 
mediation by the League of Nations marked Jiang Jieshi’s 
disillusion to the US-British; In early 1935 North China 
Incident broke out, Jiang Jieshi’s hope of compromising 
with Japan was dashed; in October 1935, the Red Army 
arrived in northern Shaanxi, and Jiang Jieshi’s attempt of 
military solution to the CPC problem also fell through. 
Internal and external difficulties forced Jiang Jieshi to turn 
to Soviet Union which was also under the Japanese threat 
and regarded as the backstage supporter of CPC. In the 
triangular relations among China, Japan and Soviet Union 
at the time, China and Soviet Union had the aspiration to 
form an alliance, but were reluctant to openly break with 
Japan. Meanwhile, due to historical grievances, China and 
Soviet Union had suspicion and temptation to each other. 
Therefore, Sino-Soviet diplomacy had to take a strategy 
of “cooperating diplomatically in the name of holding 
cultural activities”. On October 25, Sino-Soviet Cultural 
Association was established, which was the specific 
implementation of this strategy. Facts have proved that 
Sino-Soviet Cultural Association has worked as a double-
sided adhesive on the issues of “allying with Soviet” and 
“cooperating with CPC”.
1 .   S I N O - S O V I E T  C U L T U R A L 
ASSOCIATION BROKE THE ICE ON THE 
ISSUE OF LEGAL STATUS OF CPC
The legal status of CPC is a sensitive issue to KMT and 
CPC. KMT has always concerned itself as the leader, and 
regarded the second KMT-CPC cooperation as a process 
of “demonstrating sincerity” and “accepting surrender”, 
“did not, and have no intention to positively recognize 
the legitimacy of CPC.” (Yun, 1996) In fact, after Xi’an 
Incident and before Lugou Bridge Incident, several talks 
between CPC and MKT could only be held in private. To 
CPC, its legitimacy was a principle matter concerning its 
status in the united front, concerning whether KMT-CPC 
cooperation could be reached and how to maintain the 
cooperation.
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On July 7, 1937, Lugou Bridge Incident broke out, 
forcing Jiang Jieshi to accelerate the process of negotiation 
between the two parties. On August 9, with Jiang Jieshi’s 
invitation, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and Ye Jianying secretly 
went to Nanjing to participate in the national defense 
conference held by KMT government. One day in mid-
August, a tea party was held in the name of Sino-Soviet 
Cultural Association at the home of Liang Hancao, 
Secretary-General of KMT Legislature. In addition to the 
relevant personnel of Soviet Cultural Association, there 
were also Shen Junru from National Salvation Association 
and Zhou Enlai (Qian, 1985). This tea party was quite 
thought-provoking. First of all, CPC was arranged to 
take the “first show” in KMT-controlled area as a cultural 
community in Sino-Soviet Cultural Association. This 
was consistent with KMT’s attitude who later invited the 
CPC leaders as an important cultural group or economic 
group to participate in National Political Assembly, 
rather than a representative of political parties. Even 
so, this was the first time that CPC acted openly and 
legally in KMT-controlled area after the breakdown of 
the first KMT-CPC cooperation, which showed KMT’s 
tacit acceptance of the legitimacy of CPC and had a self-
evident significance for promoting the second KMY-CPC 
cooperation. Secondly, members of Sino-Soviet Cultural 
Association were mostly from KMT leadership, having a 
clear Kuomintang official color. The Soviet counter party 
of Sino-Soviet Cultural Association was Soviet Foreign 
Cultural Association which was controlled by the CPSU 
Central Political Bureau. Therefore, many views of KMT 
government which were not appropriate to express in 
public were passed to the Soviet side through Sino-Soviet 
Cultural Association. CPC delegation’s “first show” in 
Sino-Soviet Cultural Association could be considered 
as KMT’s show of cooperation with CPC, and received 
an immediate effect. On August 21, Sino-Soviet Non-
Aggression Pact long awaited by Jiang Jieshi was signed, 
marking the formal involvement of Soviet Union in the 
Chinese Anti-Japanese War. Thirdly, at this tea party, 
Zhou Enlai firstly met Shen Junru of National Salvation 
Association. On November 23, 1936, Nanjing national 
government arrested Shen Junru and other 6 leaders of 
National Salvation Association on the charge of “wantonly 
spread rumors in the name of national salvation... colluded 
with red bandits, instigated class struggle and advocated 
to overthrow the national government” (Shanghai Public 
Security Bureau’s Declaration, para.6, 1936). On April 3, 
1937, the national government delivered an indictment 
to Shen Jun Ru, etc.. On April 12, CPC published CPC 
Central Committee’s Declaration for Immediate Release 
of Shen Junru, Other Six People and All Patriotic 
Political Prisoners. The combat between CPC and KMT 
on the issue of National Salvation Association represented 
the two parties’ different attitudes to the united front. 
Since National Salvation Association had great influences 
in the national anti-Japanese movement, Shen Junru and 
Zhou Enlai’s presence at Sino-Soviet Cultural Association 
showed that KMT stated in front of people that it had 
reached a compromise with CPC on the United Front.
2 .   S I N O - S O V I E T  C U L T U R A L 
A S S O C I A T I O N  B E C A M E  A N 
IMPORTANT LINK TO MAINTAIN SINO-
SOVIET DIPLOMACY AND KMT-CPC 
COOPERATION IN THE SPECIAL PERIOD
In the early days of the war, Soviet Union was the 
country which gave the largest aid to China, and was the 
promoter of KMT-CPC cooperation. To a certain extent, 
it can be said that the stable Sino-Soviet relation was the 
prerequisite and guarantee of KMT-CPC cooperation. But 
Sino-Soviet relation was not always so easy, and the first 
major crisis was the signature of Soviet-Germany Treaty.
On August 23, 1939, Soviet-Germany Non-Aggression 
Pact was signed, which not only caused a public outcry in 
the world, but also had a tremendous negative impact on 
the  KMT and CPC. On August 27, Sun Ke, the president 
of Sino-Soviet Cultural Association visited Moscow. 
He said after the signature of Soviet-Germany Treaty, 
“there are rumors that Soviet Union and Japan will sign 
a non-aggression treaty”, so “China’s strength to fight 
against the Japanese will be weakened” (Li, 2002). This 
indicated that KMT government was very worried that 
the change in Soviet-Germany relation would cause a 
chain of reactions to Soviet-Japan relation. In order to 
eliminate the public doubt and aversion to Soviet Union, 
on November 7, Sino-Soviet Culture, the official magazine 
of Sino-Soviet Cultural Association released A Special 
Issue to Commemorate the 22nd Anniversary of the Soviet 
October Revolution. Sun Ke, Chen Lifu, Feng Yuxiang, 
Shao Lizi, Li Jishen, Chen Cheng, Liang Hancao, Zhang 
Qun, Lü Chao, Wu Dingchang, Zhang Fakui, Zhang 
Chong, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Wu Yuzhang, Pan Zinian 
and Zhang Ximan, etc. published congratulations to it. So 
many CPC and KMT politicians celebrated for the same 
incident in the same manganese during the anti-Japanese 
war, which was a rare case. What’s the most notable 
was Mao Zedong’s The Consistency of Soviet’s Interests 
and the Interests of Humanity at the invitation of Sino-
Soviet Cultural Association, which was Mao Zedong’s 
first published article in KMT-ruled areas other than in 
CPC’s own newspapers and journals. Sino-Soviet Culture 
subsequently also published Sun Ke’s defense speech to 
Soviet-Germany Treaty, 
The Soviet Union finds that it’s impossible to seek peace with 
Britain and France, and is under the threat of Germany. Germany 
is also threatened by Britain and France, and fears to be further 
threatened by Soviet if it allies with British and French. Soviet 
Union, like Germany believes that the other is the source of 
threat, so signed a non-aggression treaty with the other to reach 
a mutual understanding. (Sun, 1940) 
CPC and KMT maintained close cooperation to 
preserve the image of Soviet Union, which smoothly 
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resolved a serious diplomatic crisis of confidence. As long 
as KMT and CPC stayed the same on the issue of allying 
with Soviet Union, they still had a basis to cooperate.
3.  SINO-SOVIET CULTURAL ASSOCIATION 
CONTRIBUTED FOR RESOLVING THE 
LARGEST CONFLICT BETWEEN CPC AND 
KMT - WANNAN INCIDENT 
Due to the conflict between the fundamental interests of 
KMT and CPC, the KMT-CPC cooperation was only an 
expedient under war situation. Therefore, the two sides 
had frictions during the cooperation and it can even be 
said that friction was an essential part of the cooperation. 
During the war, the most intense conflict between the two 
sides was nothing else than Wannan Incident. On January 
6, 1941, Wannan Incident broke out. KMT and CPC’s 
relationship was at the edge of felling down and their 
relationships with Soviet Union were also in a slump. 
For Soviet Union’s misjudgment and gesticulation on 
Wannan Incident, Mao Zedong unprecedentedly called to 
Zhou Enlai, requesting him to question the Soviet military 
adviser Chuikov, “Ye Ting and Xiang Ying were captured 
and our army was annihilated. We want to hear Chuikov’s 
advice on Jiang Jieshi’s lawless act.” (Yang, 1992, p.405) 
It turns out that Wannan Incident not only affected the 
national government’s diplomatic relation with Soviet 
Union, but also had a significant impact on CPC’s relation 
with Soviet Union.
In this grim situation, Sino-Soviet Cultural Association 
played an important role in stabilizing the public and 
maintaining the KMT-CPC cooperation. On June 17, 
1941, to commemorate the 5th anniversary of Gorky’s 
death, Xinhua Daily (north edition) published an editorial 
entitled One who does not Lift His Sword will Die in 
Shame. On June 18 Sino-Soviet Cultural Association held 
an anniversary party, and Zhou Enlai, Dong Biwu, Liang 
Hancao, Feng Yuxiang, Shen Junru, Guo Moruo, Zhang 
Ximan, Lao She, Wang Kunlun and Cao Jinghua, etc. 
attended. Liang Hancao made a speech on behalf of Sun 
Ke - Why should We Commemorate Gorky (president’s 
statement), and Guo Moruo gave a speech—Living Model. 
The two speeches were published in the “Special for the 
5th Anniversary of Gorky’s Death” of Sino-Soviet Culture. 
On the same day, Yan’an held a general assembly and 
exhibitions to commemorate the anniversary. Xiao San gave 
a report entitled On Gorky’s Love and Hatred, which was 
published in that day’s Liberation Daily. Commemoration 
for Gorky was supposed to be a conventional cultural 
activity during the war, but in 1941 it became the most 
solemn one under KMT and CPC’s joint attention.
In November 1941, cultural  organizations in 
Chongqing jointly launched the celebration of “Guo 
Moruo’s 50th Birthday and the 25th Anniversary of His 
Creative Life”. For the commemoration, KMT and CPC 
gave high degree of concerns and echoed each other. 
On November 16, Xinhua Daily published Zhou Enlai’s 
monograph I’m going to Say on the front page, published 
the Special for the 25th Anniversary of Mr. Guo Moruo’s 
Creative Life, and a special report “Literary and Art 
Circles Commemorated the 25th Anniversary of Guo 
Moruo’s Creation.” On November 17, Xinhua Daily 
published a documentary report “Brilliant Twenty-Five 
Years of Poetic Writing – A Record of the Tea Party for 
the 25th Anniversary of Mr. Guo Moruo’s Creation”. 
Central Daily published an interview feature “Birthday 
of Creation – Culture Circle’s Gathering for Celebrating 
Guo Moruo’s 50th Birthday”. In addition, the KMT 
Chongqing newspaper Sao Dang Bao reported “Literary 
Anecdote – Cultural Circle in the Provisional Capital 
Congratulated Guo Moruo”. CPC Yan’an Liberation 
Daily also published a report “Mr. Guo Moruo’s 50th 
Birthday – Yan’an Cultural Circle Gathered to Celebrate”. 
Throughout the commemorations it was not difficult to 
find that, this KMT-CPC cultural cooperation was the 
most worth recording incident in the Chinese literary and 
art circles anti-Japanese united front after Wanna Incident.
After Wannan Incident KMT and CPC had conflicts in 
a number of political occasions and major issues, but they 
were quite cooperative in a series of cultural activities 
organized by Sino-Soviet Cultural Association. As long 
as the Soviet Union banner did not fall, its identity as the 
mediator between KMT and CPC was still recognized. 
The joint commemoration to Guo Moruo’s birthday 
proved that the relationship between the two parties was 
getting warmer from the freezing point.
4.  SINO-SOVIET CULTURAL ASSOCIATION 
M A D E  E F F O R T S  I N  C H O N G Q I N G 
NEGOTIATION TO AVOID RUPTURE OF 
THE KMT-CPC COOPERATION
Because Soviet Union played political seesaw between 
KMT and CPC by its own national interests, CPC and 
CPSU had also contradictions and conflicts from time to 
time, and the most serious one was Stalin’s so-called “do 
not revolution”.
As early as on December 20, 1944, Mao Zedong 
wrote comments on Dong Biwu’s report concerning the 
work to the rear area, “we must take on China in this 
war.” (Yang, 2013)  From April 23 to June 11, 1945, CPC 
held the 7th National Congress, which further showed 
its determination to overthrow KMT’s dictatorship 
and establish a joint government after the war. At the 
conference Mao Zedong predicted that Soviet Union 
would give full support to CPC after the war. But contrary 
to the expectation of CPC, on August 14 Sino-Soviet 
Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was signed, by which 
Soviet Union and the National Government reached a 
political deal. In the treaty, KMT recognized Soviet’s 
privileges provided by Yalta Agreement in China, and Stalin 
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promised to the Chinese negotiators, “all assistances will 
be given to the Chinese National Government”, which 
was written in the attachment of the treaty, “the Soviet 
government agreed to provide moral assistance, munitions 
and other supplies to China. These aids are fully given to 
the Chinese Central Government, namely the National 
Government” (Second Historical Archives of China, para.5, 
1999). Convinced of acquiring the support of Soviet Union, 
Jiang Jieshi invited Mao Zedong to Chongqing to discuss 
the national policy on the same day when the treaty was 
signed. On August 20, Jiang Jieshi sent another telegraph 
to urge Mao Zedong’s to Chongqing, Stalin also requested 
Mao Zedong’s visit, even indicating in the telegraph that “do 
not combat Jiang Jieshi. If a civil war is started, there is a 
risk of destruction of the nation.” (Mao, 1999) According to 
Mao Zedong’s Russian translator Shi Zhe, Stalin’s telegraph 
“caused great displeasure of Chairman Mao, he was very 
angry.” Years later, Mao Zedong was still reluctant to let go 
of this history, and on July 22, 1958 mentioned four times 
in the conversation with the Soviet Ambassador Eugene 
that Stalin “did not guard our revolution in the most critical 
moment” (Yang, 1997, p.217).
On August 28, 1945 Mao Zedong arrived Chongqing. 
In the afternoon of September 1, Sino-Soviet Cultural 
Association organized a cocktail reception to celebrate the 
signature of Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance 
and welcomed the new Soviet ambassador to China. Mao 
Zedong was invited to attend the reception. The party was 
presided by Sun Ke, the president of Sino-Soviet Culture 
Association. Chen Lifu, Shao Lizi, Song Qingling, Feng 
Yuxiang, Tan Zhen, Liang Hancao, Guo Moruo, Shen 
Junru, Li Dequan, Fu Sinian, Wang Kunlun, Xu Baoju, 
Mao Dun, Hou Wailu, Zhang Ximan, Yang Hansheng, Cao 
Mengjun and other key members of Sino-Soviet cultural 
Association, and about three to four hundred representatives 
from various sectors in Chongqing attended the reception.
The reception was quite noteworthy. First of all, it was 
the first time that Mao Zedong met KMT leaders since 
1924. Before the reception CPC delegation called the 
Sino-Soviet Cultural Association secretariat for additional 
invitations, which were unprecedented (Yu, 1984). After the 
reception, Zhou Enlai instructed Xia Yan to write a special 
report in Xinhua Daily “Sino-Soviet Cultural Association 
Held a Grand Meeting Yesterday to Celebrate the Sino-
Soviet Treaty of Alliance - Comrade Mao Zedong Arrived 
the Meeting in Enthusiastic Cheers and Made Historic 
Handshake with All Parties in Friendship”. This showed 
that CPC attached great importance to the cocktail party, 
and took the chance to show to the public CPC’s last effort 
to maintain the KMT-CPC cooperation. Secondly, at the 
reception Mao Zedong met Soviet Ambassador Petrov and 
military officer Luo Shen. This was the first time he met 
the representatives of the Soviet government, and he took 
this opportunity to convey some important information to 
Stalin. It’s clear that Mao Zedong attended the reception 
of celebrating the signing of Sino-Soviet Treaty in order to 
show CPC’s restraint on the CPC-Soviet relation and KMT-
Soviet relation, and it was this restraint which maintained 
the KMT-CPC cooperation that had gone bad.
CONCLUSION
Sino-Soviet Cultural Association was founded in October 
1935, and was eventually replaced by Sino-Soviet 
Friendship Association in July 1949. It lasted for nearly 14 
years and was the most active overseas cultural organization 
during the war. Its members included political dignitaries 
and cultural elites of the two parties as well as the Soviet 
Embassy staff. Its official magazine Sino-Soviet Culture 
released Vol. 1, No. 1 issue on May 15, 1936 to Vol. 20 No. 
5 issue on May 1, 1949 without any interruption, which 
was a rare case among many publications during the war. It 
served as a platform to conduct cultural exchanges and the 
two parties to carry out communications and cooperation 
with Soviet Union. Thus, Sino-Soviet Cultural Association 
had positive impacts not only on cultural exchanges and 
the Sino-Soviet diplomacy, but also the second KMT-CPC 
cooperation during the war.
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